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BIOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR : DETERMINANTS OF
PARLIAMENTARY DECISION-MAKING IN MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY
GERMANY, FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN
Heinrich Best (+)
Abstract : The purpose of this study is to investigate how signi-
ficant social-demographic characteristics are if we want to
explain the political behavior and orientations of actors in
past societies . We approached this problem on the basis of roll-
call data and biographical data of the representatives of the
Frankfurt National Assembly, the Paris Assemblée Nationale
Constituante 1848/49 and the British House of Commons 1841 -
1842 . For comparative purposes results of related studies about
the Mexican National Assembly of 1916 - 1917 and the German
"Reichstag" of 1893 and 1903 have been used . The main hypothesis
was that the social background and the social affiliations of
the representatives determined their parliamentary decision-
making . This assumption has been tested first by a heterogeneous
model ("basic model) which combines "standard" attributs of
collective-biographical research : age, profession, membership in
the nobility, and regional origin . In a second step we split up
the basic model in three partial hypotheses, which have been
derived from general assumptions concerning the genesis and
transmission of political orientations:
1. an interested oriented approach which interprets political beha-
vior according to the wish to get actual advantages in the
contest for power, wealth and prestige;
2. an approach which emphasizes the effects of socialization and
which assumes that political orientations have been acquired
during political socialization and selection by institutions
which transmit values and by experiences in the political
career;
3. a theoretical approach which is focused on geographic repre-
sentation and which assumes a close connection between parlia-
mentary decision making and the orientations of the electors.
Multiple Classification Analysis was used to test the different
models . The research reported in this paper was funded by the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
1 . PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM
The analysis of the social background of elites has an obvious justification
when it concerns the investigation of recruiting processes : social-demogra-
phic characteristics constitute elements of the opportunity structure which
determine the access and the career chances of the aspirants .(1) More pro-
blematical and controversial is the influence which the social background of
the members of the elite has on their political attitudes and behavior .(2)
Investigations concerning contemporary elites show that we must be very
careful with intuitive suppositions in this area, since the type of influ-
ence and its extent varies considerably . In various cultural contexts vari-
ables which supposedly have a large influence were far less significant than
expected .(3) On the other hand, in historical investigations an intuitive
"psychologization" of social-demographic variables, i .e . inferences from
(+) Address all communications to : Heinrich Best, Universität zu Köln,
Institut für Angewandte Sozialforschung, Greinstr . 2, 5000 Köln 41
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social structure to social psychology, is still customary .(4) The purpose of
this paper is to clarify this problem . In our analysis which is comparative
and multi-variate, we have measured the effects of frequently used biogra-
phical variables on the political attitudes of representatives . Our inten-
tion is to make a contribution to the solution of the relevance problem in
collective-biographical research and to give answers to the following ques-
tions : From which social-demographic variables does the greatest political
influence proceed in varying contexts? How great is the total effect of the
standardly used social background variables ?
This. methodological problem has substantive theoretical implications . The
strength of the statistical relationship between the biographical characte-
ristics of the representatives and the variables which measure their politi-
cal attitudes is a sensible indicator of the degree of influence that socio-
cultural cleavages have on parliamentary decision-making . We are proceeding
here from the consideration that when political cleavages emerge from reli-
gious, ethnical, and regional disparities in a society, the personal attri-
butes of representatives .related to these cleavages obtain a political
interpretation. and significance .(S) This consideration can be illustrated by
an example : The religious denomination of a representative is expected to
have no political ' relevance in a society where different denominations
coexist peacefully ; however, in a society disturbed by religious conflicts
the denomination will become group defining in the process of parliamentary
decision-making . Here we are making the distinction between a segregated and
an amorphous formation of the internal parliamentary structure . In the first
situation there is a sharp social distinction between the political groups;
in the second they are socially heterogeneous.
Proceeding from standard concepts of political sociology we will approach
the general hypothesis of an association between societal conflict
structures , and parliamentary decision-making under three theoretical
perspectives (6):
1. An interest-theoretical approach, which maintains that political action
is directed by the striving for direct and personal advantages in the
allotment struggle for power, wealth and prestige.
2. A socialization-theoretical approach, which maintains that political
attitudes are acquired in the course of political socialization and
selection by means of value mediating authorities and experiences during
a political career.
3. A representation-theoretical approach which assumes that parliamentary
decision making is linked to the expectations of the constituents.
By means of a basic model we have attempted to grasp the general connection
between social-demographic variables and political attitudes . This model
combines some standard variables of collective-biographical research which
are also the core variables of the three approaches scetched above : age and
occupation, noble status, and regional origin . The influence of the imme-
diate parliamentary context on the political attitudes of the representatives
- such as, the effects of political patronage and post-recruitment so-
cialization, of "cue taking", and of party discipline, have not been taken
into consideration in our study .
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2. DATA AND METHOD
Our investigation combines data which we ourselves collected concerning
biographical attributes and the voting behavior of the representatives of
the Paris National Assembly and of the Frankfurt National Assembly of
1848/49 with a secondary analysis of data concerning the British House of
Commons for 1841 up to 1847 .(7) Additionally, research reports were used,
which followed an approach similar to ours . These were a study of the
Mexican Constitutional Konvention of 1917(8) and an analysis of legislative
behavior in the German Reichstage for the years 1898 and 190 3 . (9)
The tools and techniques used for testing the different models scetched
above have been described in detail elsewhere.(10) Therefore we can restrict
ourselves to some brief remarks . In essence we introduced social-demographic
variables of the representatives as independent variables and correlated
them with summary measures obtained from legislative roll-call data . Whereas
the socio-demographic data pose only the familiar problems of selectivity,
completeness and categorization, a word should be said about the dependent
variable.
A major technical problem of the analysis of legislative behavior is the
reduction of often more than hundreds of votes to summary indices which are
able to represent the main dimensions of parliamentary decision making .(11)
While in the past scaling procedures were used which presupposed the one-
dimensionality of the items as, for example, Guttman-Scaling, we preferred
methods which maintain the multi-dimensionality of legislative behavior in
the process of the reduction of variables . Factor analysis is widely regar-
ded as suitable for this analytical purpose .(12) As an additional advantage
factor scores can be interpreted as sensible measures for the political
positions of representatives .(13) Since factor scores have a metrical
measurement level, they can be used as dependent variables together with
qualitative biographical characteristics of the representatives in analyses
of variance. With this we operationalize a major theoretical aspect of our
investigation : the analysis of the extension of socio-cultural cleavages
into the parliaments and the variation of this connection in different
polities.
3. RESULTS
3 .1 . The Dimensions of Legislative Behavior
By the factor analysis of roll-call behavior (oblique solution) we identi-
fied one dominant principal factor for each of the three parliaments stu-
died . The variance explained by that factor amounted to 47% in Germany, 21%
in France, and 37 % in Great Britain . The factor having the next greatest
eigenvalue lies clearly under these values : in Germany at 10 %, in France at
2 %, and in Great Britain at 5 % . A check of the factor loadings and the
factor score correlations of the main factor with information about the
political affiliations of the representatives (especially their party mem-
bership) clearly shows that the main factor represents the right-left-
dimension of political attitudes .(14) . This is an important substantive
result . It shows that a dominant conflict front had developed in the three
representative bodies we investigated in spite of all the differences in the
length of parliamentary tradition, the range of political participation, and
the extent of national integration . This conflict front spanned two poles
which can be termed - the terminology may vary but the content remains the
same - conservative-progressive, radical-moderate, left-right . At this point
we have to refrain from the tempting task of discussing these findings in
GRAPH 1-3 : THE DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE LEFT-RIGHT-
INDEX
Graph 1 :
	
Graph 2:
French National Assembly
	
Frankfurt National Assembly
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detail . In our context these findings are interesting only insofar as the
factor analysis of roll-call voting behavior provides equivalent indicators
which measure comparable political positions of representatives in the three
parliaments.
If the factor scores are assigned to the individual representatives, one
arrives at a scale that provides information about the distribution of
parliamentarians according to "left" and "right" positions . The distribution
form in all three cases is clearly bimodal . Positions on the right are
indicated by positive score values and positions on the left by negative
score values . The extreme values lie respectively at circa + 2 ("extreme
right") and -2 ("extreme left") . The modes lie at circa +1 and -1. The
grand sample means for all three parliaments are zero because factor scores
are standardized.
The examination of mean score value deviations between the categories of the
independent, in our case biographical, variables is the basis of Multiple
Classification Analysis (MCA) . This is the method that we have used to test
the model variants developed in Section 1.(15) The following major
statistics are provided by MCA:
1. Raw mean score values for each category of each independent (predictor)
variable . These measures provide us with information, for example, about
the average extent of "leftist" tendencies among publicists as compared
to other occupational categories.
2. ETA-values, which indicate the ability of each predictor variable to
explain the variation in the dependent variable . These coefficients give
us information, for example, about the significance of the variable
"regional origin" as compared to the variable "occupation".
3. " Adjusted" mean score values, which indicate what the mean would have
been if the group had been exactly like the total population with respect
to its distribution over all the other predictor classifications . This
measure accounts for what we call the contingency of biographical at-
tributes . With this we refer to the fact that social-demographic vari-
ables do not vary independently from one another . For example, an over-
proportional number of large landowners are from the nobility and admi-
nistrative officials usually have a legal education . The statistical
complement of this circumstance is multicollinearity . If we want to
determine the net-effect of social-demographic variables, it is necessary
to adjust the data for such interactions . In the following analysis we
have chosen an approach in which the interaction of each independent
variable with all other independent variables is controlled (Classic
Experimental Approach) .(16)
4. BETA statistics which are directly analogous to ETA, but are based on the
adjusted means rather than the row means . BETA provides a measure of the
effect of a social-demographic variable, after the effects of all other
background variables have been controlled.
5. R 2 as an estimation of the proportion of variance in the dependent
variable explained by all predictors together . This coefficient gives us
information, for example, about the superiority of the socialization-
theoretical or the interest-theoretical models.
Since our investigation aims at determining the effect of the configuration
of biographical attributes on political behavior, we will be mainly
referring to the BETA-values and to R 2 when interpreting results . The
variations of adjusted mean score values of the right-left index for
different social categories will be considered here only in reference to
occupational categories . It should be noted that even in relation to the
variable occupation a full comparison is only possible between the Frankfurt
National Assembly and the Paris National Assembly . In the British House of
Commons only a small section of the occupational system was represented as a
result of
	
the incompatibility provisions and the rigid electoral
restrictions.
3 .2 . The Test of the Basic Model
3 .2 .1 The Relationship Between Occupation and Political Attitudes
The test results of the basic model including all five types of information
are presented in tables 1a to 1c for the three parliaments we investigated.
If we compare the adjusted mean values of the left-right index for
occupational categories and political systems a constellation of deviations
and similarities appears which indicates both the influence of general
determinants as well as the effect of specific socio-cultural conditions on
political attitudes .
Table 1 a - 1 c insert here
The somewhat diffuse results of this investigation are summarized in the
follnoing synopsis:
Germany France Great Britain
.Left
(Mean score
index : <-.10)
Lawyers,
Publishers
Workers,
Petite
Bourgeoisie,
Publishers
Businessmen,
Publishers
Indifferent
(Mean score
index :
	
.10 .
	
- .10)
Judicial
Service,
Administrative
Service,
Businessmen,
Landowners
Lawyers,
Officers,
Businessmen,
Landowners
Lawyers,
Officers
Right
(Mean score
index : > .10)
Educational
Sector,
Officers,
Clergy
Educational
Sector,
Administrative
Service,
Clergy,
Judicial
Service
Landowners
Two general statements can be distilled from these results:
1 . In the parliaments we analysed there was no clear connection between
economic interests and political attitudes . Neither large landowners nor
businessmen can clearly be assigned to one political position . This
finding is surprising because it contradicts the long-used practice of
treating "the" bourgeoisie or "the " landed interests as a single actor
whose specific class interest should have had a regulative effect on
political action .(17) On the contrary, it becomes clear that political
attitudes and behavior can not be satisfactorily explained by class
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TABLE la - lc : THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AND
POLITICAL ATTITUDES : A MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF
THE BASIC MODEL
Independent Variables : Regional Origin, Noble Status, Occupation
Covariate :
	
Age
Dependent Variable :
	
Representatives' Position on the Right-Left-
Index
(Positive Values : Right Positions
Negative Values : Left Positions)
Table la : The Members of the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49
Independent N Mean Posi- ETA Mean Position BETA
Variables and tion on the on the Right-
Categories Right-Left- Left-Index
Index (un- (Adjusted for
REGIONAL ORIGIN
adjusted) Independents
and Covariate)
Bavaria
Southern Small and
75 .43 .43
Middle States
Central German Small
77 - .93 - .85
and Middle States
Northern Small
81 - .68 - .62
and Middle States 82 .13 .18
Prussia :
	
Rhineland 75 .27 .26
Prussia :
	
Baltic Prov . 108 .59 .48
Prussia :
	
Silesia,
	
Sax . 76 .16 .11
Austria :
	
Bohemia 41 - .68 - .63
Austria : Other Provinces 112 .13 .12
NOBLE STATUS
.51 .46
No 616 - .09 - .05
Yes 111 .48 .30
OCCUPATION
.21 .13
Judicial Service 137 .14 .03
Administrative Service 140 .10 .03
Educational Sector 124 .11 .18
Officers 15 .58 .32
Clergymen 34 .29 .31
Businessmen 50 - .06 .00
Landowners 57 .30 .04
Lawyers
Publishers, Other
105 - .46 - .30
Professions 64 - .50 .29 - .29 .19
2
Grand Mean =
	
.01 R = .31 N = 776
Number of missing observations = 49
- 78 -
Table lb : The Members of the French National Assembly 1848/49
Independent
Variables and
Categories
N Mean Posi-
tion on the
Right-Left-
Index
	
(un-
adjusted)
ETA , Mean Position
on the Right-
BETA
Left-Index
(Adjusted for
Independents
and Covariate)
REGIONAL ORIGIN
Brittany 120 .57 .45
South West 60 - .09 - .06
Languedoc 129 - .44 - .40
North East 104 - .62 - .59
Central Mountains 207 .14 .15
Burgundy 47 - .57 - .50
Paris Area, Champagne 203 .27 .26
Colonies 16 .07 .03
.40 .36
NOBLE STATUS
No 755 - .10 - .08
Yes 131 .60 .44
.25 .18
OCCUPATION
Judicial Service 67 .08 .13
Administrative Service 34 .38 .23
Educational Sector 34 .02 .13
Officers 45 .22 .07
Clergymen 14 .85 .66
Businessmen 117 .00 .07
Landowners 195 .18 .05
Lawyers 234 - .10 - .05
Publishers,
	
Other
Professions 101 - .34 - .28
Petite Bourgeoise,
Workers 45 - .39 - .26
.23 .16
2
Grand Mean = - .01 R = .22 N = 910
Number of Missing Observations = 24
Table 1c:
	
The Members of the British House of Commons 1841-1847
BETAIndependent N Mean Posi- ETA Mean Position
Variables and tion on the on the Right-
Categories Right-Left- Left-Index
. Index
	
(un- (Adjusted for
adjusted) Independents
Regional Origin
South England 291 .16
and Covariate)
.16
North England 256 .02 .05
Scotland 63 - .32 - .28
Ulster 36 .62 .54
South Ireland 77 - .72 - .78
.31 .31
Noble Status
No 402 - .08 - .01
Yes 321 .11 .01
.09 .01
Occupation
Landowners 332 .15 .14
Businessmen 102 - .48 - .48
Lawyers 111 .01 .07
Publishers, Other
Professions 26 - .68 - .73
Officers
	
(Also Retired) 152 .10 .08
.25 .25
2
Grand Mean =
	
- .01
	
R =
	
.16 N = 723
Number of Missing Observations= 92
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interests. We have a picture of a diversely shaped political landscape
showing lines of coalition and conflict that transcend classes.
2 . Some findings indicate that the horizon of political experience
characteristic of a specific occupational category allows for a better
prediction of political positions than economic interests do. This is
especially true of the different possibilities and ways to obtain
positions of power or appropriation opportunities controlled by the
state . Thus, a large number of judges and administrative officials in the
French National Assembly had obtained their positions as a result of
"patronage" . As favorites of the July-Monarchy they distanced themselves
from a reform or revolutionary course . Their sympathies were for the
right.(18) On the other hand, their German counterparts were chiefly
career civil servants, who viewed politics as a continuation of their .
official business by other means . They could look back at a tradition of
a "revolution from above" which was carried out by the civil service . In
view of the varying degrees of loyalty and conviction their political
attitudes were more heterogeneous .(19)
The situation was different with the military : In Germany during 1848 and
1849 they were commonly seen as the defenders of the monarchical princip-
le. In France there was a "praetorian" tradition which could be connected
to the positions of the left . In Great Britain the officers as a social
category could not be placed in any specific political position .(2o)
These few hints suggest that the occupational background of the representa-
tives influenced their political positions via their political experiences
before entering into the parliament and not via their economic interests.
An examination of the BETA statistics confirms that the variable
"occupation" is 'less significant than the wide-spread hypothesis of a
guiding of political attitudes by economic interests suggests . In the
British House of Kommons and in the Frankfurt National Assembly the
significance of "occupation" was behind that of "region" . In the Paris
National Assembly it was also behind the variable "noble status" . In the
Mexican Constituent Convention occupation and age were those variables with
the least explanatory power.
The range of this finding, however, appears to be limited . For the Reichstag
at the turn of the century there is a definitely stronger connection repor-
ted by Smith and Turner (ETA = 0 .5) .(21) Though this result is subject to
the reservation that the contingency of biographical variables has not been
adequately controlled in this investigation we nevertheless suppose that
the findings for the Kaiserreich indicate a process which contemporaries
called the "socialization of parliament" : i .e . the progressive crystaliza-
tion of political structures along socio-economic cleavages .(22)
But, even if the scope of our findings is reduced, we can maintain that the
often unexamined but imputed explanatory power of the variable "occupation "
for political attitudes is relativized by our results . Thus, the adoption of
left and right positions is not, as a rule, a function of interests and
mentalities related to occupational status.
3 .2.2 The Connection Between Age and Political Attitudes
The age of the parliamentarians had the least influence of the variables
included in the basic model . This is true for all of the three parliaments
we investigated as well as the Mexican Constituent Convention and the
Reichstage of 1898 and 1903 . The contribution of age to the explanation of
the variance of the left-right-index varies between s % and 3 % . This
finding as well as technical considerations motivated us to introduce age
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only as a covariate in our model . What should be kept in mind is that the
conflict between right and left positions, in all those cases for which we
have data, can not be interpreted as cohorts or as generation conflicts .(23)
3 .2 .3 The Connection Between Noble Status and Political Attitudes
Noble status had a relatively large influence in the Frankfurt National
Assembly and in the Paris National Assembly . No findings were reported in
this connection for the Reichstage at the turn of the century or - as is
evident - for the Mexican Constituent Convention . It is noteworthy that in
France the effect of noble status remains relatively stable even after
controlling for the variables "occupation" and "region" . Its influence on
political positions does not appear to have been a function of economic
interests or regional power constellations, but mainly the consequence of
genuine "estate" orientations . On the other hand, in the Frankfurt National
Assembly the weight of the variable noble status diminished considerably
after controlling it for the remaining independent variables . Here its
effect is superseded by regional influences : Central and Southern German
nobles tended to occupy a position further to the left than their Eastern
German counterparts .(24) Finally, in Great Britain noble descent had
practically no significance for the determination of political positions in
the left-right-dimension . This is a result that agrees with the findings of
other investigations . They show that there is relatively little class
distinction on the part of the British aristocracy towards the other
segments of the upper-class .(25)
3
.2 .4 The Connection Between Regional Origin and Political Attitudes
The electoral region of the representative is the variable which has the
greatest effect on their political positions in all of the parliaments we
investigated . This findingings are also ascertained by Peter Smiths study of
the Mexican Constituent Convention . (26) The fact that region is a
notoriously "difficult" variable precludes the attempt at an illuminating
intuitive interpretation of these result . Region comprises territorial
disparities of economic, social, and political structures, and one can hardly
decide ad-hoc whether this catalog of variable dimensions is complete, or in
what combination they became effective.
We have attempted to bring some light into this darkness by making an
analysis of ecological data provided by the Statistique de la France . Up
until now such an investigation has not been feasible for either the
representatives of the British House of Kommons or for the members of the
Frankfurt National Assembly, since comparative ecolocigal data is lacking at
the level of the electoral district .(27)
A change of the units of analysis is connected with this step of the
investigation : the attributes of the individual representatives are no
longer of interest, interesting are the characteristics of the departments
in which the representatives were elected . All in all 46 indicators were
introduced which refered to the following properties of the departments:
-
to the settlement structure (distribution of inhabitants among different
classes of community size, concentration of inhabitants in 1846,
proportion of the non-indigenous population);
-
to the agricultural structure (proportion of the different classes of farm
size, hectar price for first quality agricultural land, proportion of
family members who were active or assisted in the agricultural economy);
-
to regional mobility (change in the population concentration between 1841
and 1851) ;
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-
to the business structure (proportion of population as employees or
workers in large and small businesses);
- to the structure of the tertiary sector (proportion of the population in
the professions and in the civil service);
- to pupil and student quotas ; and
-
to the proportion of the population eligible to vote under the census
system (1846).
By a factor analysis the original 46 indicators were "melted down" to ten
factors which catch the structural characteristics of the departments . They
are : urbanization (variance explained : 27,3 %), proportion of members of the
civil service (9,4 %), settlement structure (7,9 %), "wealth" (6,8 %),
dominance of large (5,2 %) and small farms (4,7 %), pupil quota (4,3 %),
proportion of professions and clergy (3,6 %), proportion of doctors (3,4 %),
and proportion of workers and employees in the industrial sector (3,1 %) . In
order to examine the connections between socio-economic context on the
department level and political positions of the representatives, we have
applied a stepwise regression analysis . The independent variables used were
the factor-scores obtained from the ecological data, the proportion of
rightist representatives was introduced as the dependent variable.
With an R 2 of .14 the explanatory power of the ecological model was low.
The factor "dominance of small farms", which has a BETA value of - .2 had the
greatest weight . This actually means that the proportion of rightist repre-
sentatives in those departments having a small proportion of small farms
tended to be large . In view of the weak correlation this finding should be
substantively interpreted only with caution and it is far from being a
sufficient explanation for political regionalism in mid-nineteenth century
France (R 2 -change = 0 .04) . It seems reasonable to attribute this failiure
to the inability of our data to cover the politically relevant aspects of
regional economic and social structure . There is also a theoretical substan-
tiation of this reservation since economic and socio-structural disparities
should not be equated eo ipso with interest conflicts . An interest differen-
tiation requires always a "cultural definition of a situation" before it is
transformed . into a political conflict .(28) However, both objections do not
hold true in the given case . If we replace the dependent variable "percen-
tage of rightist representatives" with the number of votes obtained by Loùis
Napoléon in the presidential election of December 1848, the explanatory
power of the ecological variables increases to a remarkable 57,1 % . This
result - which in spite of the temporal closenesss clearly deviates from the
findings for the representatives of the Assemblee Nationale Constituante -
cannot be given a further substantive interpretation here . It must be suffi-
cient here to indicate that the ecological data do in fact comprise poli-
tically relevant aspects of the regional context, and that their small
contribution to the explanation of the regional differentiation of the
political camps in the Assemblée Nationale Constitutante can not be attri-
buted to their insufficient indicator quality.
The supposition that the more or less amorphous political attitudes of the
representatives directly reflected the regional disparities of the social
and economic structure is seemingly too simple to comprehend the actually
more complicated mediating process . On the other hand, as the high BETA
values in table r b show, both political camps are all too clearly
concentrated in strongholds in certain departements . Thus, we can not assume
that the representatives had acted independently of regional influences . The
question is raised once again concerning the causes of the clear
regionalisation of the political structure - a finding which differs so
markedly from the rather unclear picture which the analyses of the
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relationship between social class and political attitudes had provided.
A glance at the political topography of France during the investigatory
period gives us a first hint : the distribution of the strongholds of both
political camps follows in rough lines the borders of the provinces of the
Ancien Regime . The leftist centers were in Southern France (Provence,
Languedoc, Roussilion, Foix) in Burgundy, in the area of the Gironde
estuary, in Flanders, in Alsace, and in Lorraine . The centres of the right
were in Brittany and in the adjoining areas (Anjou, Maine, Vendée,
Normandy), in the southern part of Central Fance, in the Paris basin, Picar-
dy, Artois and in the Champagne area . The rest of Central France tended to
be
	
indifferent :
	
i .e .
	
it sent delegations in which neither the
representatives of the right nor those of the left were clearly dominant.
With all necessary caution we suggest interpreting this pattern of geogra-
phical distribution of the political camps as an expression of a center-
periphery conflict whose historical roots go back to the formative phase of
the French state during the Ancien Régime . If one follows this
interpretation, origin from the peripheries would explain an affinity for
the left . These peripheries were integrated into the French monarchy at a
late period, had maintained a certain administrative independence for a long
time, and were centers of protestant resistance in the denominational con-
flicts of the 17th century (Deux Sèvres, Charente Inférieure) . On the
other hand, origin from the core areas of the old monarchy favored the
adoption of a rightist position . We assume that regional leadership groups
had an essentail function in mediating these political traditions . It is
known that they arranged the lists of candidates, and influenced the
voting-behavior of the representatives in Paris.(29)
Since we do not have similar comprehensive regional data for Germany and
Britain as for France, we can hardly decide whether these findings and
interpretations can be extended . A first glance at the political topography
of Britain and Germany, however, suggests the general applicability of the
French pattern ; it speaks for the superiority of such explanations which
attribute the regionalization of political camps to cultural and admi-
nistrative traditions as against to differing socio-economic contexts . Thus,
in Germany the left was mainly recruited from the territorial rubble of the
old Empire in South, West, and Middle Germany, i .e . from those regions
annexed to the newly organized single states after the dissolution of the
Holy Empire . A pronounced loyalty to the ruling dynasties had not developed
in these regions . They were frequently seen as imposed regimes . In Great
Britain, Scotland and Southern Ireland were the centers of the parliamentary
left . These territories were integrated into the United Kingdom at a late
period of time and they never had ceased to oppose the integrating
centre .(3o)
3 .2 .5 The Explanatory Power of the Basic Model
If we examine the total effect of the variables combined in the basic model,
it becomes evident that the significance of social demographic variables,
even after including regional origin, was relatively low . In the case of the
Frankfurt National Assembly, age, noble status, electoral region, and
occupation, all taken together, explain the variation in the left-right-
index only up to 31 % . A comparison with the other parliaments shows an even
lower effect : for the Paris National Assembly the variance explained was
22%, for the British House of Commons from the year 1841 to 1847 it was only
16 %. Using a similar model Peter Smith determined a value of 27 % for the
Mexican Constituent Convention of 1917 .
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The frequent supposition that social background determines political
attitudes is not supported by these findings . The social profiles of
representatives from the right and the left do not differ considerably in
the parliaments we studied . Thus, differences in such political positions
can not be interpreted as conflicts between clearly differentiated social-
demographic camps . This weak correlation exists independently of the
economically, socially, and politically varying contexts.
3 .3 .1 The Interest-Theoretical Model
After the detailed discussion of the basic model, we will only briefly refer
to the model variants and restrict ourselves to a comparison of the
explanatory power of the different models.
We have distinguished two dimensions of the representatives' social position
in order to test the interest-theoretical model . In the one hand, there is
their "situs", i .e . their position in the system of the social division of
labor as seen from a functional perspective . The indicator here is
"occupation" . On the other hand, there is their "status", i .e . their
position in a system of social super- and subordination . Here the indicator
is "social class" . In the case of Great Britain we have introduced additio-
nal information about the quality of the education of the representatives
and, as a covariate, information about their wealth . In the case of France
and Germany there is additional information about intergenerational mobili-
ty.
TABLE 2a - 2c : THE INTEREST-THEORETICAL MODEL
Table 2a : The Members of the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49
Idependent Variables ETA BETA
SOCIAL CLASS .30 .25
OCCUPATION .27 .26
VERTICAL MOBILITY .10 .10
2
R = .14
Table 2b : The Members of the French National Assembly 1848/49
Independent Variables ETA BETA
SOCIAL CLASS .28 .30
OCCUPATION .20 .16
VERTICAL MOBILITY .06 .03
2
R = .10
Table 2c : The Members of the British House of Commons 1841-1847
Independent Variables ETA BETA
SOCIAL CLASS .22 .15
OCCUPATION .23 .17
EDUCATIONAL STATUS .19 .12
2
Covariate : Wealth
	
R = .09
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Despite the rather differentiated construction of the interest-theoretical
model, its explanatory power remains small . In Germany the variance
explained is about 14 %, in France and Great Britain it lies at about 9%
and 10 % of the total variance of the dependent variable . The
representatives' wealth and their social mobility had no significant
influence on political attitudes.
The relative importance of the remaining variables varies contingent upon
the national and historical context . While in the Paris National Assembly
status effects dominate, in Germany situs and in Britain also the kind of
education have a similar importance as status . We assume that these
differences are attributable to the specific shape of socio-economic clea-
vages . In 1848 and 1849 in France the most important issues were the access
to power and the right of participation for social classes that had been
disenfranchized before.(31) In Great Britain the corn laws, the factory
bill, and the electoral laws dominated parliamentary discussion ; here
distribution conflicts between economic sectors crossed with class con-
flicts .(32) In Germany both cleavages were present too . The attempts at
constructing a unified internal market aggravated opposing interests within
different economic sectors, whereas issues such as the abolition of aristo-
cratic titles and feudal privileges referred to the stratification system of
the society
.(33)
3 . 3 .2 The Socialization-Theoretical Model
We have tested the socialization-theoretical model in two variants, which
include, first, the father's occupation and the educational status of the
representatives second, their experience in the process of political
socialization . As the result of an insufficient database we could not
analyze all three parliaments under both aspects . We have tested the
influence of value-mediating authorities, such as parents, school, and
university for Great Britain and Germany . For France and Germany we studied
the effect of experiences in the process of political socialization before
the accession to the parliamentary mandate . Here the variable constellation
comprised : "persecution resulting from political reasons", "acceptance and
resignation of political functions in the civil service " , and "succession to
political offices" . In France additional variables were included : "father's
political function " and "length of membership in parliament before 1848".
Table 3a - 3b insert here
In France the explanatory power of this model variant is 13 %, in Germany
only 3 %. This striking deviation is difficult to explain . In Germany the
small weight attached to the variable "political persecution" is
particularly irritating . We had expected a stronger connection to political
attitudes, since it is plausible to expect that the experience of political
persecution gave way to a fundamental opposition against the monarchical
system . However this was not the case. For the relatively weak connection
between political experiences prior to 1848 and political positions during
1848 as compared to France, we would suggest the explanation that in Germany
the political system was incompletely differentiated .(34) Whereas in France
political restrictions and preferences had a discriminating character which
affected different status groups and political communities in different
ways, in the pre-constitutional German states all those who did not partici-
pate directly in the framework of the institutions of the bureaucratic state
were excluded from the decision-making process . Thus, a vehement criticism
of the bureaucracy was by no means simply a concern of bourgeois leftists.
It was also expressed by the members of the landed aristocracy who saw a
TABLE 3a - 3b : THE SOCIALIZATION-THEORETICALMODEL : POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
Table 3a : The Members of the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49
Independent Variables ETA BETA
POLITICAL PERSECUTION .09 .07
CIVIL SERVICE MEMBERSHIP .11 .11
POLITICAL OFFICES .10 .08
2
R = .03
Table 3b : The Members of the French National Assembly 1848/49
Independent Variables ETA BETA
POLITICAL PERSECUTION .21 .21
CIVIL SERICE MEMBERSHIP .12 .10
POLITICAL OFFICES .27 .26
FATHER'S POLITICAL FUNCTIONS .13 .08
2
Covariate :
	
Length of Parlia- R = .13
mentary
	
Membership
before 1848
TABLE 4a - 4b : THE SOCIALIZATION-THEORETICAL-MODEL:	 SOCIAL ZAITION
IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
Table 4a : The Members of the Frankfurt National Assembly 1848/49
Independent Variables ETA BETA
FATHER'S OCCUPATION .17 .15
UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED .05 .06
SUBJECTS STUDIED .15 .14
2
R = .03
Table 4 b : The Members of the British House of Commons 1842-1947
Independent Variables ETA BETA
FATHER'S OCCUPATION .20 .16
PUBLIC SCHOOL ATTENDET .17 .05
UNIVERSITY ATTENDED .32 .28
2
R = .13
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danger to their traditional prerogatives.(35) In Germany the pre-March
opposition was at first a heterogeneous collective movement which split into
two political camps immediately before the March revolution .(36)
Table 4a - 4b insert here
The differences between Great Britain and Germany with reference to the
significance of the socialization experiences during childhood and in the
educational system are similarly striking . In Germany the socialization-
theoretical model explains 5 %, in Great Britain 13 % in the variance of the
dependent variable . We attribute this deviation to the different systems of
elite socialization in both countries . The data show that in Great Britain
the university, more than parents or school, was the value mediating
authority with the greatest political impact . This result supports those
hypotheses which assume a growing influence of later socialization
experiences in the course of political socialization . (37) In Germany the
significance of the university attended and the subjects studied is
considerably less significant than in Britain . We attribute this to a more
regionally dispersed and more accessible university system, which, in
comparison with Britain, aimed at imparting knowledge rather than
values .(38)
3 . 3 . 3 The Representation-Theoretical Model
The representation-theoretical model had the most explanatory power for all
of the three parliaments we studied and for the Mexican National Convention
as well . For Great Britain we tested this model by using an approach which
includes information about the geographical situation of the constituency,
its size (measured according to the number of voters), and its status
(differentiated according to county and borough) . Further, data were in-
cluded which indicated whether the representative was a resident or non-
resident of the constituency . In Germany in addition to the variables "si-
tuation of the constituency" and "relationship to constituency" we have
included the length of residency of the representative and, as a covariate,
the number of times the representative changed his residence.
TABLE 5a - 5b : THE REPRESENTATION-THEORETICAL MODEL
Table 5a : The Members of the Frankfurt Nationale Assembly 1848/1849
Independent Variables ETA BETA
SITUATION OF THE CONSTITUENCY .46 .48
RELATIONSHIP TO THE CONSTITUENCY .05 .10
LENGTH OF RESIDENCE .05 .12
2
Covariate :
	
Changes of Residence R = .24
Table 5b : The Members of the British House of Commons 1841-1847
Independent Variables ETA BETA
SITUATION OF THE CONSTITUENCY .32 .39
RELATIONSHIP TO THE CONSTITUENCY .13 .01
STATUS OF THE CONSTITUENCY .30 .43
2
Covariate : Number of Voters R = .23
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The explanatory power of the representation-theoretical model is 23 % for
Britain . For Germany it explains 24 % of the variance of the dependent
variable . These values come close to or are even higher than the values
obtained for the basic model . This result confirms the central importance of
the factor "region" . Within the framework of the representative-theoretical
model, all those variables which refer to the characteristics of the consti
tuency had a significant influence on political attitudes whereas the kind
and the length of relationship to the constituency is irrelevant . This
finding indicates that the ties to the electoral region were effective
despite geographical distance and a representative's short length of resi-
dence there . This is also true for France where the factor "region" was very
important no matter how direct the relationship of the representative to his
electoral departement was
. (39)
In this paper we have already discussed in greater detail the kind of
regional influences and the ways they were mediated . We have to admit that
in this area our knowledge is still incomplete . In any case, however, it
could be demonstrated that the influence of the factor "region" is larger
than the usual preference on the part of many researchers for the interest-
theoretical model would seem to justify . This result came unexpected since
modernization theories maintain that in the course of national integration
territorial conflicts between regions are superseded by functional conflicts
between classes and economic sectors .(40) Our data show that territorial
conflicts retain their central importance regardless of whether we are
considering mature national states such as England or France or an
unfinished national state such as Germany.
4. SUMMARY
Regardless of the constant significance of regional influences the
importance of other biographical variables varies considerably in different
political and historical contexts . This finding strengthens the criticism of
an approach which treats the connections between social-demographic
variables and political behavior to some extent as anthropological
constants.(41) In all, the influence which social-demographic variables had
on political behavior was, in our investigation, clearly above the level of
irrelevance . At the same time it was far away from determining the political
positions of the representatives . The influences of the immediate
parliamentary field of forces and the individual margins of action were
clearly larger than theories of an external social guiding of parliamentary
decision making could comprise . First findings of further research indicate,
however, that in the German Kaiserreich the connection between social-
demographic variables and political attitudes became stronger .(42) Par-
ticularly since the beginning of the 1880s a transition can be observed from
an amorphous parliamentary system with socially heterogeneous political
groups to a segregated parliamentary system with political camps clearly
separated demographically from each other . This was a period in which
specific social-demographic variables received a new political interpreta-
tion and significance . In this phenomenon we see an expression of the
increasing importance of social-cultural cleavages as well as their growing
influence on the formation of the political landscape.
Similar developments can be observed in Great Britain and France . In the
decade after 1849 the era of class politics and the rise of working-class
parties began .
	
Instead of traditional loyalities and paternalistic
dependencies economic interests became the single most important group
defining force in all three polities subjected to our investigation.
Provided that we experience the decline of class-politics today in Western-
- 89 -
European countries, a fact that is mostly discussed under the keyword
"postmaterialism " , our findings suggest that this may be the completion of a
secular cycle which departed from a "prematerialist" shape of politics in
the middle of the 19th century .(43)
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